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RESUMEN
La importancia de las instituciones políticas en el crecimiento eco-
nómico en países en desarrollo no ha sido adecuadamente estudiada. El
desarrollo económico argentino hacia fines del siglo XIX y principios del
XX se basó en la producción agropecuaria de exportación. La estructura
de producción se sostuvo con un sistema generalizado de contratos de
arrendamientos. Este artículo utiliza análisis espacial y regresiones
logísticas para estudiar el rol del Congreso Nacional en dar forma al
marco legal de dichos contratos para el período 1912-1943. La principal
conclusión es que las reformas legislativas fueron un producto del fun-
cionamiento de las instituciones políticas en el Congreso, que proveye-
ron de poder de veto a los Conservadores para suavizar las reformas pro-
puestas por los Radicales. El fraude electoral en los años treinta detuvo
el proceso reformista en el Congreso y dio paso a cambios más revolu-
cionarios a partir de 1940.
Palabras clave: Argentina 1912-1942, Instituciones, derechos de pro-
piedad, crecimiento económico
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1 Taylor, «Rural Life In Argentina», p. 174.
2 See Palacio, «Judges, Lawyers and Farmers»; Halperin Donghi, «Buenos Aires Landed
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ABSTRACT
The importance of political institutions in the economic performan-
ce of developing countries is generally overlooked. Argentine economic
development in the 19th and early 20th centuries relied on the produc-
tion of rural exports. The production structure in agriculture was sup-
ported by the widespread use of tenancy contracts. This paper uses spa-
tial analysis and logistic regression to study the role of Congress in sha-
ping tenancy legislation for the period 1912 to 1943. The finding is that
legislative reform was a product of how political institutions worked in
Congress providing veto power to Conservatives over the proposals of
Radicals. Electoral fraud in the 1930s stopped tenancy legislation and
gave rise to revolutionary changes in the 1940s.
Keywords: Argentina 1912-1942, Institutions, property rights, econo-
mic growth
JEL Classification: N56, P16, P48, Q15, O17, D72
«Everyone desires and believes in land ownership. There is pro-
bably no society in the world whose members prize ownership of
farm land more highly than Argentina and there is no conviction
more widespread among Argentines than the idea that a wider dis-
tribution of land ownership would help to develop a better and
more democratic social order. This conviction is shared alike by
many owners of large tracts of rich Pampas land and more than
200,000 tenant farmers —large and small. Most city people, whe-
ther or not they know anything about rural life, quite generally
believe the same thing» 1.
1. INTRODUCTION
Argentina’s economic development in the last part of the nineteenth
century and the first decades of the twentieth century relied on the dyna-
mism of its rural sector. Because of the concentration of land in few
hands and the inability of Conservative governments to produce effecti-
ve legislation to subdivide land in the Pampean region, production was
structured around a widespread system of tenancy and sharecropping.
Free market forces determined contractual relations according to the
regulations laid down in the Constitution and the Civil Code 2. Moreover,
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immigration of rural workers and farmers from Europe helped to foster
a vigorous market for leasing. By 1912 about 65 per cent of all farms
were under some type of leasing contract. As the population grew
quickly and the economy boomed, the ensuing demand for land boosted
rent and farm prices. Therefore, owners benefited most from the incre-
ase in prices. In 1912 the political system opened to democracy offering
renters the opportunity to voice their concerns in the political arena. In
the legislative election of 1914 a new political force, the Radical Party,
won popular support and began to displace Conservatives from Congress
and governmental offices. In 1916 the Radicals won the national presi-
dential election and their leader, Hipolito Yrigoyen, became President.
The traditional view in Argentina’s economic history is that, despite
timid attempts, neither Conservatives nor Radicals pursued tenancy
reform; only in the 1940s did a populist government introduce changes
in legislation regarding tenancy. This paper analyses how democracy
and congressional political institutions generated a tug of war between
the representatives of owners and renters in Congress between 1912
and 1943, preventing the passage of comprehensive tenancy reform.
The historical narrative is complemented by a spatial analysis of politi-
cal preference and a logistic regression of roll call vote in Congress.
These techniques facilitate an understanding of the political alignments
in Congress with respect to tenancy reform and how political preferen-
ces evolved over time. Four major conclusions stem from the analysis
of the evolutionary path of tenancy legislation during this period. First,
Radicals and Conservatives had diverse constituencies which establis-
hed different preferences for legislation, even though they shared a
common vision of the broad economic model concerning rural exports.
Second, Radicals voted for new legislation concerning rural rents,
without trying to overthrow the tenancy system. They sought to impro-
ve living conditions in the countryside but still allowed markets to be
the main instrument for resource allocation. Third, political institu-
tions and veto points played a decisive role in shaping legislation
throughout this period. The mild results in terms of regulatory changes
were a product of the institutional setup of Congress, instead of simple
lack of will from the government in office. Nonetheless, there were
important changes in the 1930s moving towards stricter rent control
and contract regulation legislation. Fourth, the particular political envi-
ronment in the 1930s, electoral fraud and the lack of representation
prevented the passage of new legislation and led to the revolutionary
reforms during the Peronist era 3.
ANDRÉS GALLO
254
4 See Adelman, «Frontier Development», and Taylor, «Latifundia».
5 See Díaz Alejandro, «Essays», and Di Tella and Zimelman, «Los ciclos».
6 See Diaz Alejandro, «Essays», and Rock, «Argentina».
7 See Solberg, «Peopling the Prairies», and Solberg, «Nationalism».
8 See Solberg, «Peopling the Prairies».
9 See Solberg, «Social Unrest»; Adelman, «Socialism and Democracy», and Walter, «Poli-
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2. THE IMPORTANCE OF RURAL RENTS IN ARGENTINA
In the early twentieth century, tenancy contracts allowed land subdivi-
sion in the Pampean region without the need for significant land reforms
or changes in property rights 4. The economic and social situation in the
Pampean region produced several results in terms of political demands,
especially in agriculture, which differ from the situation in the rest of the
country. First, since the second half of the nineteenth century, economic
growth was driven by the exporting sector, with heavy reliance on cattle
and agriculture (wheat, maize and flaxseed) from the Pampean region 5.
Those provinces outside the Pampas lacked crops or products to compete
on international markets and were growing at much lower rates (Table 1)6.
Second, the economic opportunities in the Pampean region attracted
European immigrants 7. Most of the farmers coming to Argentina to work
the land settled in this region 8. The lack of open lands determined the
extensive use of rents as a mechanism for subdivision of farming land
(Table 2). As a result, the Pampean region had a high proportion of
medium-sized farms and tenant farmers with political demands who had
not been represented by the political system before 1912, but found better
conditions when democracy was allowed (Table 3) 9.
TABLE 1
CEREAL PRODUCTION
Source: Dirección de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico.
Tons Percentage of the total
Wheat Maize Linseed Wheat Maize Linseed
Buenos Aires ...................... 1,885,578 2,488,032 315,382 34.4 43.8 24.7
Santa Fe ............................. 965,107 1,780,400 497,724 17.6 31.3 39.0
Cordoba.............................. 1,682,562 727,420 184,773 30.7 12.8 14.5
Entre Rios .......................... 256,827 78,800 243,543 4.7 1.4 19.1
La Pampa ........................... 551,29 5 57,200 23,892 10.1 1.0 1.9
Other Provinces ................. 143,969 548,600 12,499 2.6 9.7 1.0
Total.................................... 5,485,338 5,680,452 1,277,813 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Pampean Region ...... — — — 97.4 90.3 99.0
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10 See Halperin-Donghi, «Argentine Export Economy»; Adelman, «Frontier Development»,
and Díaz Alejandro, «Essays».
11 See Taylor, «Latifundia»; Solberg, «Prairies and the Pampas»; Barsky, «Agro pampe-
ano», and Tulchin, «Relationship».
12 See Taylor, «Peopling the Pampas».
13 See Adelman, «Frontier Development»; Cortés Conde, «Progreso Argentino»; Cortés
Conde, «Vicissitudes», and Gallo and Cortes Conde, «Historia Argentina».
14 Rural settlement in countries like Argentina, Canada and the United States generated
different political tensions depending on the type of settlement process each country follo-
wed. «The outbreak of rural unrest in both Argentina and Canada in the years before the
War signalled the end of the open frontier era. Not surprisingly, Argentine producers aimed
their umbrage at landowners, while Canadian farmers excoriated banks and the distant fede-
ral government. It was no longer self-evident that the system of property relations which
appeared so promising in the 1890s, could sustain continued expansion on either the pampas
The increase in tenancy coincided with high economic growth and a
boom of the exporting sector 10. As has been shown in the literature, pro-
ductivity and investment were similar on rented versus owned land 11.
Several factors led to an increased demand for reform in tenancy legis-
lation. First, immigration of rural workers from Europe created an acti-
ve market for tenancy contracts, increasing land demand and, conse-
quently, rent and land prices 12. Second, the settlement of agricultural
land was completed by 1914 13. Therefore, demographic pressure on the
fixed productive factor produced the necessary conditions for the surge
of protests by tenant farmers 14. The first incident, which started a series
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF RURAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND TENANCY
CEREALS AND LINSEED (EXCLUDING MAIZE)
Cereals and linseed (excluding maize)
(*) Note: includes all types of rural establishments.
Source: Agricultural Census 1937 and Dirección de Estadística, Anuario Estadístico.
Renters plus Sharecroppers as % of total
Total
Year
Buenos Santa
Córdoba
Entre La
Pampean
Aires Fe Rios Pampa
Region
(%) (%)
(%)
(%) (%)
(%)
1912........................... 70.10 64.16 71.23 58.94 72.14 67.38
1924........................... 64.90 66.34 66.40 55.92 64.59 64.30
1929........................... 61.90 62.88 62.00 55.72 64.84 61.43
1932........................... 64.33 66.74 63.52 56.74 60.91 63.67
1933........................... 67.28 62.06 65.15 55.60 63.51 64.15
1937(*) ...................... 65.24 62.76 47.72 48.93 62.21 58.62
1947(*) ...................... 61.60 59.15 53.93 45.70 57.33 57.40
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or the prairies». Adelman, «Frontier Development», p. 261. See also Adelman, «The Social
Bases of Technical Change».
15 See Solberg, «Prairies and the Pampas»; Ansaldi, «Conflicto obrero-rurales pampeanos»;
Solberg, «Rural Unrest», and Arcondo, «El conflicto agrario».
of proposals for legislation favoring tenant farmers, was the rural strike
in 1912, known as El grito de Alcorta, which resulted in the creation of
the FAA (Federacion Agraria Argentina), the main organization defending
the rights of small farmers and tenants 15. The main issues voiced by
tenant farmers throughout the Pampean region were: lower rents, longer
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND POSSESSION
Source: Agricultural Census 1914 and 1937.
Pampean Region Rest of the Country
(Thousands) (Thousands)
1914 1937 1914 1937
No. Hectares No. Hectares No. Hectares No. Hectares
Total.......... 189,2 67,242 266,9 67,692 117,3 95,652 167,5 106,910
0-25........... 43,5 480 58,0 696 57,2 484 91,6 858
26-100....... 55,9 3,428 90,1 5,549 24,0 1,388 37,1 2,096
101-500..... 70,6 15,885 102,2 24,288 16,0 3,962 19,6 5,446
501-1000... 9,0 6,231 9,5 8,984 4,8 3,413 6,9 6,559
1001-5000. 8,1 18,463 4,9 12,731 11,8 29,488 8,0 20,583
5000+........ 1,9 22,752 1,9 15,443 3,3 56,914 3,9 71,365
Percentage
0-25........... 23.0 0.7 21.7 1.0 48.8 0.5 54.7 0.8
26-100....... 29.6 5.1 33.8 8.2 20.5 1.5 22.2 2.0
101-500..... 37.3 23.6 38.3 35.9 13.7 4.1 11.7 5.1
501-1000... 4.8 9.3 3.6 13.3 4.1 3.6 4.2 6.1
1001-5000. 4.3 27.5 1.9 18.8 10.1 30.8 4.8 19.3
5000+........ 1.0 33.8 0.7 22.8 2.8 59.5 2.4 66.8
Average Average Average Average
Area 1914 Area 1937 Area 1914 Area 1937
Total.......... 355 254 815 638
0-25........... 11 12 8 9
26-100....... 61 62 58 56
101-500..... 225 237 247 278
501-1000... 688 938 707 938
1001-5000. 2,269 2,573 2,487 2,544
5000+........ 11,807 8,094 17,215 17,918
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16 See Solberg, «Rural Unrest».
17 See Rock, «Politics in Argentina»; Smith, «Argentina», and Botana, «El orden conser-
vador».
18 See Rock, «Politics in Argentina»; Smith, «Argentina», and Jones, Saiegh, Spiller and
Tommasi, «Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians».
19 See Rock, «Politics in Argentina»; Botana, «El orden conservador», Gallo and Conde,
«Historia Argentina», and Halperin Donghi, «Buenos Aires».
20 See Yablon, «Patronage, Corruption and Political Culture».
21 See Yablon, «Patronage, Corruption and Political Culture».
contract terms, compensation for improvements to rented land and fre-
edom to contract with third parties for buying farm machinery and
tools 16. The political changes happening at this moment of Argentine
history gave renters the opportunity to reach Congress with their
requests.
3. DEMOCRACY, POWER AND VETO POWERS IN CONGRESS:
1912-1921
One of the most revolutionary changes in Argentine political institu-
tions was the opening of the political system in 1912 through the Ley
Saenz Peña. This law implemented two comprehensive reforms neces-
sary in a democracy —the secret ballot and a reform of the electoral
roll 17. As a result of these reforms, local political leaders could no longer
control voting and many types of fraud were eliminated even though the
nomination process continued to be controlled by the party elite 18. These
reforms were brought about by the Radical party’s pressure on the
Conservative government by refusing to engage in any election 19. Thus,
part of the motivation to reform voting laws was to bring the Radicals
into the system and reduce confrontation 20.
The real difference between Radicals and Conservatives in terms of
political preference is an issue far from being settled in Argentine histo-
riography. Electoral support for the Radicals came from middle classes in
both urban and rural areas, forming a coalition with the members of the
elite who controlled the party leadership 21. As Dario Canton (1966)
demonstrates, the economic class background of Radical and
Conservative Congressmen in 1916 did not differ, with 33 per cent of the
Deputies of each group coming from high-income classes. Nonetheless,
the Radical party had a larger representation of immigrants in Congress
than did the Conservatives. Furthermore, as shown by Peter Smith
(1974), in the years following 1916, the majority of Radical Congressmen
came from the middle classes in contrast to the Conservative congress-
men’s aristocratic origins. The tension between aristocrats and the mid-
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22 See Ansaldi, «Profetas de cambios»; Ansaldi, «Caso de nomenclaturas»; Rock, «Politics
in Argentina», and Smith, «Argentina».
23 See Pucciarelli, «Conservadores, Radicales e Yrigoyenistas»; Rock, «Politics in Argen-
tina»; Rock, «Radical Populism»; Smith, «Los radicals argentinos»; Solberg, «Social unrest»;
Walter, «Politics, Parties»; Ansaldi, «Caso de nomenclaturas»; Ansaldi «Profetas de cambio»,
and Giacobone, «Radicalismo».
24 «In Congress, UCR deputies from the province generally —although not always— sup-
ported the passage of social legislation and measures to aid small farmers. Generally, also
in contrast with the Conservatives, the Radicals tended to support more equitable, distri-
butive economic policies, the gradual absorption of foreigners into the political process and
stronger controls on the activities of foreign economic enterprises». See Walter, «Elections»,
at 717.
25 See Solberg, «Rural Unrest», and Halperin Donghi, «Intimations».
26 Each province was an electoral district for the election of Deputies. Each party pre-
sented an open list of Deputies. Candidates could be removed from the list.
27 Deputies are elected for four years and half the chamber is renewed every two years.
Senators are elected by the Provinces’ legislatures and have tenure for nine years. A third of
the chamber’s seats are renewed every three years.
dle class within the Radical Party produced severe strains leading to a
definitive split in the 1920s 22. However, because of the middle-class natu-
re of the Radical party, the traditional view has been that the Radicals did
not propose a drastic departure from the economic policy of Conservative
governments, given their shared vision of the rural-export economy 23. To
the contrary, this paper shows that despite the similarities in economic
policy between Radical and Conservative governments, the Radical party,
being a party of the masses and having to win the popular vote, was sub-
ject to strong pressure from its electorate and was therefore aligned with
the demands of the majority of the electorate in rural areas, i.e. small far-
mers and tenants, while the Conservatives continued to maintain their
close ties with the big landowners of the Pampas 24. As a consequence,
even though Radicals shared common political goals with Conservatives,
the political demands of tenant and small farmers created enough pres-
sure on the legislators of the Radical, Socialistas and Democrata
Progresistas to promote new legislation 25. Furthermore, if we look at the
final legislation enacted by Congress it seems that the Radicals did not try
to introduce important reforms. However, if we look at the initial bill and
how it was reformed by Congress, especially the Senate, we can appre-
ciate the importance of the political institutions, the effective blocking of
legislation by the Conservatives in the Senate and the differences in pre-
ferences between legislators.
Because members of the Chamber of Deputies were elected by popu-
lar vote (unlike Senators) they were strongly affected by the Saenz Peña
Law 26. Since the turnover of seats in the Chamber of Deputies was gra-
dual, it took four years, i.e. three elections, for the Radical party to
obtain the majority of seats (Table 4) 27. The increase in seats won by the
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28 See Giacobone and Gallo, «Radicalismo bonaerense».
29 The provincial legislatures elected the Senators for the Provinces. Accordingly, they
represented the majority of the Legislature which in most cases was from the same party as
the Governor. During this period, the Conservatives controlled the elections at local level and
were able to maintain the majority of the seats in the Senate.
30 See Rock, «State Building»; Rock, «Politics in Argentina»; Botana, «El orden conser-
vador»; Gallo and Conde «Historia Argentina», and Halperin Donghi, «Buenos Aires».
Radical party resulted from the decline of the share of provincial
Conservative parties 28. However, due to the fact that local elections were
held under different regulations from national elections, the
Conservatives were able to maintain their political power locally and, as
a result, continued to control Provincial governments and the Senate,
but lost the Chamber of Deputies (Table 4) 29. As Table 4 shows, Radicals
and Conservatives were not homogeneous parties with the same struc-
ture and constituencies in every province. Each province had its own
characteristics, which affected the preferences of representatives. As
such, different branches of the Conservatives had different names in
each province reflecting the characteristics of the local politics (Table 4).
The fragmentation of politics in Argentina is well documented and goes
back to the early stages of the institutional formation of the country 30.
The Radical and Socialist parties were the first to attempt to create
homogeneous political bodies throughout the country. This paper sepa-
rates Deputies in Congress according to their political affiliation and the
region they came from. In the case of the many Conservative parties,
representatives from different provinces are grouped together in
Congress despite the differences which existed between them. Even
though this division simplifies the situation, it allows us to evaluate how
the issue of rural rent regulations separated the political spectrum into
two well-defined groups. Even though the relationship between repre-
sentatives and socioeconomic actors is not straightforward, tis is a
period in which democracy is in flux and actors and representatives are
learning to deal with the new system. This paper facilitates an unders-
tanding of how social demands were filtered through the political
system. As such, it analyzes actual voting behavior in Congress which,
despite the ideological ties of each Congressman or party, determined
the final legislation for the country.
Congress was the main vehicle for the passage of new legislation. An
important group within the Chamber of Deputies was the Agriculture
Committee which handled all bills coming into the Chamber; the
Committee debated bills and had the power to stall or to change a bill
before sending it to the floor. Therefore, the parties and regions repre-
sented in the Committee played an important role in the production of
the final bills.
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During this period, the Committees in both Chambers controlled
both the characteristics of a bill and its agenda. Although party leaders
of the Chamber or even the Executive Power could influence Committee
members to send a bill to the floor or to delay it, the control of the
Agriculture Committee was still a key factor in producing a bill and pas-
sing it on to the floor. As the Radical party gained seats in the Chamber
of Deputies they increased their participation in the Committee. It is
interesting to notice how, until 1914, the majority of the Committee
members were from provinces outside the Pampean region but, by 1920,
all Committee members came from the Pampas. The Radicals,
Socialistas and Democrata Progresistas controlled the Committee 31.
Unlike the Chamber of Deputies, the distribution of political forces in
the Senate did not change much after the reforms to the electoral law,
TABLE 4
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND SENATE COMPOSITION: 1914-20
(Percentage of seats)
Source: Molinelli, 1999.
Chamber of Deputies
1914 1916 1918 1920
UCR (Radical).................................... 23.9 37.9 48.7 55.3
Socialista ............................................ 7.7 7.8 5.2 6.6
Unión Cívica ...................................... 5.1 — — —
Unión Nacional.................................. 4.3 — — —
Conservador ....................................... 21.4 24.1 16.5 9.2
Oficial ................................................. 5.1 — — —
Constitucional.................................... 6.0 — — —
Coalición Liberal Autonomista......... 6.0 2.6 2.6 2.0
Demócrata Progresista ...................... — 6.9 12.2 12.5
Radical Disidente............................... — — 7.0 —
Other parties ...................................... 20.5 20.7 7.8 14.5
Total .................................................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Senate
1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921
Conservadores .................................... 85.7 80.0 82.1 60.9 56.0 56.0
UCR (Radical) .................................... 7.1 13.3 10.7 26.1 32.0 32.0
Socialista ............................................ 3.6 3.3 3.6 4.3 4.0 4.0
UCR (Santa Fe) .................................. 3.6 3.3 3.6 8.7 8.0 8.0
Total .................................................... 100 100 100 100 100 100
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33 See Gallo, «Political Economy».
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35 See Palacio, «Judges, Lawyers and Farmers».
36 See Díaz Alejandro, «Essays».
37 See Gallo, «Political Economy».
allowing Conservatives to maintain the majority of the seats (Table 4).
Thus, the experience of the Radical government is one of divided govern-
ment with the Conservatives having a key veto power in the Senate 32.
Conservatives also controlled the Senate Agriculture Committee. Most of
the members of this Committee came from provinces outside the
Pampean region 33.
4. TENANCY LAWS OF THE FIRST RADICAL GOBERNMENT:
1916-1922
The Radical administration proposed few bills for tenancy reforms:
In 1917, Yrigoyen sent a homestead bill called La Ley del Hogar and ano-
ther bill which would have created an Agriculture Bank, neither of which
were passed by Congress 34 and, as a result, until 1919 only a few tenant
farmers’ bills were presented in Congress. The first bills proposed by the
Socialistas were a direct outcome of the Grito de Alcorta strike. It is
important to notice how the number of bills in the Chamber of Deputies
increased along with the number of seats gained by the Radicals
(Figure 2). The Executive Power tried to introduce tenancy legislation in
1919 but, as illustrated in this section, despite the interest of the govern-
ment and the Chamber of Deputies in enacting tenancy legislation, the
veto power of the Conservatives in the Senate did not leave much room
for thorough reforms. As a result, the legislation enacted was modest or
even ineffective. Furthermore, loopholes in the laws, coupled with a low
level of enforcement, did not revolutionize the tenancy structure of the
Pampas 35.
Even in the face of such strong opposition a willingness to reform,
which was the result of several factors, continued to exist. First, the
recession produced by the international market crisis caused by the
Great War affected rural areas and renters 36. Second, protests in the
rural areas of the Pampean region became more vigorous, leading to
several strikes and demonstrations after 1912. Third, the Radical party
gained the majority of the Seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1918
election (Table 4). Finally, the Radicals and other allied parties contro-
lled the Agriculture Committee 37.
ANDRÉS GALLO
262
38 HCD, 1919.
39 HCD, September 21st 1920, Reunión 53, p. 323.
40 HCD, Reunión 52, September 21st 1921, p. 322.
41 Federación Agraria Argentina, July 13th, 1920, HCD, Reunión 24, p. 178.
42 Isaac Francioni (UCR) Santa Fe, HCD, Reunión 53, September 21st 1920, p. 342.
43 Nicolas Repetto (P. Socialista) Cap. Federal, HCD, Reunión 53, September 21st 1920,
p. 351.
The Executive Power sent a bill to the Chamber of Deputies on July
2nd 1919 38 which became the building block used by the Agriculture
Committee to draft the bill sent to the floor 39. The Committee made
substantial changes to the Executive Power’s bill by limiting and remo-
ving many of the proposed reforms (Table 5). Although this seems diffi-
cult to understand, it may be seen as stemming from two main causes.
First, as mentioned before, the tension between the two different bran-
ches of the Radical party could have influenced the drafting of the law
and Deputies coming from smaller provinces, where renters had but lit-
tle influence on elections, may not have supported the reforms. Second,
the Chamber of Deputies may have been employing a strategy of appea-
sement because of the strong opposition to the bill in the Senate. By
reducing the number of reforms in the bill, they could persuade the
Senate to vote favorably. In the end, the bill sent to the floor attempted
to satisfy renters’ demands by fixing contract terms to three years, pro-
hibiting subleases, mandating that owners refund to renters certain
costs of improvements to the land, allowing renters freedom to contract
with third parties and several other regulations.
On September 21st 1920, the Chamber of Deputies debated the bill
sent to the floor by the Agriculture Committee (Table 5) 40. This bill clo-
sely resembled, finally, most of the petitions tenant farmers had presen-
ted during the Grito de Alcorta in 1912 and the petition of the Federacion
Agraria Argentina (FAA) made to Congress 41.
Despite the improvements in contracting conditions for tenant far-
mers, Deputies were aware of the limitations imposed on the freedom
to contract but justified them for social needs: «To satisfy this [Social]
need to reform control of agricultural contracting, we had to admit
certain limits to the contracting freedom, but these limits do not cur-
tail the basic freedom and are required for social order, stability and
interest» 42.
Deputies attempted to exchange efficiency for equity by giving certain
rights to the rural renters. For example, the bill proposed granting land
tenure stability to renters, compensating for improvements to the land,
granting freedom to contract and restricting seizure of some work tools,
animals and seeds 43. However, the Conservatives voiced their discontent,
claiming that tenants often failed to respect their contracts and sugges-
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44 HCD, Reunión 53, September 21st 1920, pp. 345 and 349.
45 HCD, Reunión 57, September 27th 1921, pp. 606-621.
46 Honorable Camara de Senadores (HCS), Reunion 53, 43a Sesión Ordinaria, September
30th 1920, p. 1257.
47 See Solberg, «Prairies and the Pampas».
48 HCS, Reunión 46, 31a Sesión Ordinaria, September 30th 1921, p. 488.
49 Senator Garcia, HCS, Reunión 46, 31a Sesión Ordinaria, September 20th 1921, p. 495.
50 Senator Caballero, Diario de Sesiones, HCS, Reunión 46, 31a Sesión Ordinaria, Sep-
tember 20th 1921, pp. 493-494.
ting that the instability in the length of contract terms might well be due
to the irresponsibility of tenants rather than owners 44. The Chamber of
Deputies passed the bill on September 27th 1920 45. The bill met strong
opposition in the Senate when it arrived on September 30th 1920 and it
was sent to the Agriculture and Codes Committee where it was shelved 46.
In 1921, after a massive protest of farmers in front of the Congress, the
Senate agreed to consider the bill 47. The Agriculture and Code
Committee sent the bill to the floor on September 20, 1921 48.
Nonetheless, some Senators voiced their disapproval of the farmers who
marched to the Federal Capital and Congress to protest:
«They came here from I do not know what towns or in represen-
tation of what farmers and had incredible signs, and they marched
to the Congress singing Le Marseilles, or something I have never
understood, because their music had a tendency or tone that was
close to “Leninism”. (Laughs from other Senators)» 49.
As expected, the Senate significantly reduced the reforms introduced
by the Chamber of Deputies before passing the bill (Table 5). The prefe-
rences of Senators were different from those of Deputies and the
Executive. Most Senators considered this unrest a local problem for the
Pampean region and therefore did not want the law to be extended to the
whole country. They wanted to protect their own jurisdictions from such
a regulation:
«It is without doubt that, in general, this bill was conceived with a
spirit of localism; in its broad characteristics it does not apply to
other regions, regions that we have not fully examined or regions
that have not been subject to conflicts. The bill coming from the
Chamber of Deputies had these deficiencies. Perhaps, the bills’
authors had in mind the region affected by the 1912 conflicts, that
is, the Southern region of the Province of Santa Fe, Center of La
Pampa, part of the Province of Buenos Aires and South of
Cordoba» 50.
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51 Senator Luis Linares (Conservative), from Salta. HCS, September 24th, 1921, pp. 574-
576.
52 Senator Julio A. Roca (Conservative), from Cordoba. HCS, September 24th, 1921,
pp. 577-578.
53 It is interesting to note that that the Agricultural Committee gave the Deputies a copy
of the bill approved by the Senate in which the part of the first article where the clauses of
the law were limited to lands producing cereals was missing. Consequently the Chamber of
Deputies voted the law without knowing the existence of this clause.
Accordingly, the bill underwent some significant changes in an effort
to reduce the loss of owners’ rights. First, it was amended so that it
would apply only to land rented for cereal production (Table 5). This
change was crucial in convincing Senators to accept the four-year term
for tenancy contracts. Many Senators were against the four-year term,
mentioning the advantages of short-term contracts as a way of selecting
good renters and avoiding agency problems 51. Because of the strong
opposition to the four-year term, it seemed the law would not be passed;
however, once a Radical Senator proposed changing the first article,
limiting the application of the law to rent contracts for cereal production
only, the day was saved for the Radicals and the farmers 52. By limiting
the regulation to cereal areas, that is, the Pampean region, and leaving
the rest of the country free from any regulation, the Radicals were able
to pass the law since Senators from the other provinces ceased their
opposition.
The Senate also introduced other changes. They removed the article
governing renewal of contracts after the four-year term, thereby giving
flexibility to both parties on successive renewals (Table 5). They modi-
fied the article concerning subletting giving the renter the opportunity to
sublet for a period shorter than the one established by Deputies
(Table 5). Furthermore, they included two extra articles with specific
owners’ rights and renters’ duties. First, the owner could evict renters in
the case of division of the land for sale. Second, the owner could evict if
the renter did not comply with clauses in the contract. Finally, Senators
protected the tax base of their provinces by limiting tax exemption of
contracts to Federal territories.
As a result of the modifications the Senate achieved its objective by
limiting the law to the richest part of the country and leaving most of the
provinces exempt from regulation. The approved bill came back to the
Chamber of Deputies on September 28th 1922. The members of the
Agriculture Committee wanted Deputies to approve the bill as it came
from Senate without any further debate, fearing that any delay would
risk its passage. The members of the Committee played down the impor-
tance of the changes introduced by the Senate 53 and two influential
members of the Committee, Juan B. Justo (Socialista) and J. R.
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54 See Rock, «Radical Populism».
55 See O’Connell, «Free Trade».
56 See Rock, «Radical Populism».
57 «...The danger of establishing the limits to the rented land area is that —since owners
or intermediaries with bad intentions try to avoid the law— they rent land plots just above
the 300 hectares limit». Deputy Roque Coulin from the UCR (Santa Fé) proposing the bill
Chamber. HCD, September 18th, 1929, p. 593.
Rodriguez (Radical), insisted that their colleagues vote in closed session
with only one general vote to accept or reject the bill. The proposal was
accepted and the bill was passed. This maneuver to gain a quick appro-
val from the Deputies illustrates the difficulties the Radicals, Socialistas
and Democratas Progresistas experienced in the Senate and suggests the
contempt they had for the modified law. Law 11,170, enacted in 1921,
was the first regulatory norm for rural rents created in Argentina.
5. THE SECOND REFORM: 1929
From 1922 to 1928, Marcelo T. de Alvear succeeded Yrigoyen as
President of the country. Alvear came from the same party as Yrigoyen
but had a different political orientation 54. Even though he won the elec-
tion with the explicit support of Yrigoyen, he formed a group within the
Radicals, called the UCR Antipersonalista, which was actually closer to
the Conservative party’s policies 55. By 1924, the division in the Radical
party into Personalistas (followers of Yrigoyen) and Antipersonalistas
was formalized 56. The division of the Radicals in Congress made it much
more difficult to pass any bill reforming rural renter legislation.
Throughout Alvear’s presidency all initiatives on rural legislation were
stalled in Congress or never debated at all. In the two years following the
approval of Law 11,170 in 1921 a few tenancy bills appeared in the
Chamber of Deputies but Congress never considered them.
The Radical party (Personalistas) won the election of 1928, giving
new strength to attempts at reform. The branch of the Radical party led
by Yrigoyen controlled the Chamber of Deputies and was now very close
to contesting the Conservative majority in the Senate. As a consequence,
the Agricultural Committee proposed a new bill to the Chamber of
Deputies changing and expanding some of the articles of Law 11,170; in
practice, there had been many problems in enforcing this law because
owners could easily avoid its strictures simply by renting plots larger
than 300 hectares. The new bill proposed numerous changes (Table 6) 57.
These changes widened tenant farmers’ rights by including all types of
rural usages not simply cereal production, increasing contract terms,
introducing the obligation of a written contract to avoid scams and limi-
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58 See debates in the Chamber of Deputies in 1920 and the Senate in 1921 where all the
speculations about these subcontracting practices are debated and the preferences to legis-
late against these groups of firms are clearly expressed.
59 Deputy Nicolas Repetto (Socialista), from Cap. Federal, supporting the bill presented
in the Chamber. HCD, September 18th, 1929, p. 595.
60 Message from the Executive Power to the Senate, November 19th, 1929. HCS, Novem-
ber 19th 1929, p. 735.
ting subcontracting. Because of the renewed power of the Radicals in
Congress, Deputies insisted on regulating all contracts in the country,
not just in the Pampean region. In the case of subcontracting, Deputies
wanted to prevent speculation on the part of firms which rented large
land extensions to subdivide and sublet smaller plots to tenant farmers.
They wanted to avoid the overpriced contracts these companies offered
by banning such a practice. Law 11,170 failed to do so, since the exten-
sion limit plus the changes introduced by the Senate preserved the right
to continue subcontracting practices. The new bill limited such a possi-
bility to specific cases of death or injury of the renter 58.
Most of the adjustments proposed by the Deputies were influenced by
the desires of their rural constituencies, namely farmers and cattle ran-
chers. Nicolas Repetto explained the need to attend to these political
demands and warned the Deputies about the dangers of failing to provi-
de new legislation:
«The Deputies can relax for the moment, because there are a high
proportion of foreigners among our producers. But the day will
come when the children of these foreigners, the Argentineans, will
want to mobilize and claim for themselves the share of the agri-
cultural product that belongs to them. Then, on that day, if the
legislation is not ready, some movement in the rural sector will
remind those who govern that there is a great need to be satis-
fied» 59.
However, the bill still had to go through Senate where Senators tried
to avoid considering it at all. The Codes Committee received the bill from
the Deputies on September 27th 1929 but did not pass a resolution
during the Ordinary Session. By November 19th, the Executive Power
sent notification to the Senate asking them to include the bill in the
extended period for Ordinary Sessions, «...[The bill] has to pass imme-
diately so the new agricultural year can begin in a position of a legally
mandated atmosphere more humanitarian, fair and conducive to redu-
cing the costs that nowadays burden National production» 60.
Finally, on January 25th 1930, the Senate debated the bill and passed
it with minor changes (Table 3). This time, the Conservatives were too
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: RURAL RENTER LEGISLATION...
269
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
L
aw
1
1
,1
7
0
D
ep
u
ti
es
S
en
at
e
T
A
B
L
E
6
N
E
W
B
IL
L
R
E
F
O
R
M
IN
G
L
AW
11
,1
70
—
Ty
p
e
of
la
n
d
—
E
xe
m
p
ti
on
s
—
Te
rm
—
S
u
b
le
t
—
L
an
d
av
ai
la
b
le
ot
h
er
u
se
s
—
P
ro
ro
gu
e
—
R
en
ew
al
—
Im
p
ro
ve
m
en
ts
—
S
p
ec
ia
l
In
st
it
u
ti
on
—
F
re
ed
om
to
co
n
tr
ac
t
L
an
d
fo
r
ce
re
al
cr
op
s
an
d
n
ot
m
or
e
th
an
30
0
h
ec
ta
re
s
Ir
ri
ga
te
d
la
n
d
4
ye
ar
s
A
cc
ep
ts
su
b
le
t
fo
r
le
ss
th
an
4
ye
ar
s
5%
b
u
t
li
m
it
ed
to
sh
ar
ec
ro
p
p
in
g
co
n
tr
ac
ts
N
o
A
ft
er
th
e
fi
rs
t
4
ye
ar
s
th
e
p
ar
ts
ca
n
ch
oo
se
te
rm
of
co
n
tr
ac
t
S
p
ec
if
y
im
p
ro
ve
m
en
ts
to
b
e
p
ai
d
b
y
th
e
ow
n
er
.
L
im
it
:
10
%
va
lu
e
of
la
n
d
N
o
T
h
e
re
n
te
r
or
sh
ar
ec
ro
p
p
er
is
fr
ee
to
co
n
tr
ac
t
w
h
oe
ve
r
h
e
ch
oo
se
s
A
ll
ty
p
e
of
fa
rm
s.
N
o
ar
ea
li
m
it
s
L
an
d
fo
r
p
as
tu
re
s,
sh
or
t
co
n
tr
ac
ts
5
ye
ar
s
P
ro
h
ib
it
ed
u
n
le
ss
th
e
ow
n
er
au
th
or
iz
es
th
e
re
n
te
r
to
d
o
so
,
an
d
it
is
fo
r
at
le
as
t
5
ye
ar
s.
S
u
b
le
t
fo
r
le
ss
th
an
5
ye
ar
s
is
au
th
or
iz
ed
in
ca
se
of
d
ea
th
or
d
is
ab
il
it
y
of
th
e
re
n
te
r.
S
u
b
co
n
tr
ac
ti
n
g
is
vo
id
if
p
ri
ce
is
15
%
h
ig
h
er
th
an
th
e
ag
re
ed
in
th
e
co
n
tr
ac
t.
Id
em
N
o
R
en
ew
al
ca
n
b
e
m
ad
e
fo
r
an
y
te
rm
,
b
u
t
th
e
co
n
tr
ac
t
is
su
b
je
ct
to
ev
er
y
la
w
re
gu
la
ti
on
Id
em
.
A
rb
it
er
s
w
il
l
d
et
er
m
in
e
th
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
im
p
ro
ve
m
en
ts
N
o
Id
em
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
N
o
R
en
ew
al
co
u
ld
b
e
of
an
y
le
n
gt
h
b
u
t
su
b
je
ct
to
ot
h
er
re
gu
la
ti
on
s
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
N
o
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
ANDRÉS GALLO
270
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
L
aw
1
1
,1
7
0
D
ep
u
ti
es
S
en
at
e
T
A
B
L
E
6
(C
on
t.
)
—
S
ei
zu
re
—
Ta
xe
s
—
R
en
te
r
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s
—
O
w
n
er
ob
li
ga
ti
on
s
—
S
al
e
of
la
n
d
s
—
C
on
tr
ac
t
—
E
vi
ct
io
n
C
an
n
ot
se
iz
e
w
or
k
to
ol
s
an
d
se
ed
u
p
to
ce
rt
ai
n
li
m
it
s
an
d
sp
ec
if
ie
s
to
ol
s
an
d
an
im
al
s
to
b
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
T
h
is
ex
em
p
ti
on
is
va
li
d
in
F
ed
er
al
te
rr
it
or
ie
s,
b
u
t
n
ot
on
p
ro
vi
n
ci
al
ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
on
s
To
u
se
th
e
la
n
d
fo
r
th
e
p
u
rp
os
e
es
ta
b
li
sh
ed
in
th
e
co
n
tr
ac
t.
To
m
ai
n
ta
in
ex
is
te
n
t
ca
p
it
al
in
go
od
sh
ap
e
O
w
n
er
s
ca
n
ev
ic
t
re
n
te
rs
in
or
d
er
to
d
iv
id
e
th
e
la
n
d
fo
r
sa
le
— In
ca
se
of
n
o
p
ay
m
en
t
of
le
as
e
or
ad
eq
u
ea
te
u
se
of
la
n
d
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
co
n
tr
ac
t,
ow
n
er
ca
n
ev
ic
t
re
n
te
r
Id
em
,
m
in
or
ch
an
ge
s
C
on
tr
ac
ts
ar
e
ex
em
p
t
fr
om
ta
xe
s
fo
r
5
ye
ar
s
Id
em
W
h
en
th
e
n
u
m
er
of
re
n
te
rs
ex
ce
ed
s
25
an
d
th
er
e
is
n
o
sc
h
oo
l
w
it
h
in
10
ki
lo
m
et
er
s,
th
e
ow
n
er
h
as
to
p
ro
vi
d
e
a
b
u
il
d
in
g
fo
r
a
sc
h
oo
l
E
li
m
in
at
ed
O
b
li
ga
ti
on
of
a
w
ri
tt
en
co
n
tr
ac
t
Id
em
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
Id
em
D
ep
u
ti
es
S
ou
rc
e:
H
C
D
,
S
ev
er
al
Is
su
es
.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: RURAL RENTER LEGISLATION...
271
61 HCS, January 25th-28th 1930.
62 «I leave; I do not want to contribute myself to the sanction of a bad law», Senator
Linares from Salta. HCS, January 28th 1930, Reunión 70 Continuation 7th prorogue Ses-
sion, p. 353.
63 See Poole and Rosenthal, «U.S. Presidential Elections»; Poole and Rosenthal «Analy-
sis of Congressional Coalitions»; Koford, «Dimensions», and Poole and Rosenthal, «Spatial
Model».
weak in the Senate to impose a series of changes similar to those of 1921.
A bitter debate between Conservatives, Radicals and Socialists regarding
the elimination of types of farms to be included and minimum plot size
took place. Nonetheless, Radicals and Socialists were able to carry the
reforms 61. Some Conservatives who strongly opposed the law left the
floor, disgusted with the resulting law and their inability to fight against
it 62. The only change the Committee proposed was to let the parties fre-
ely decide contract terms after the first five-year contract.
Once the law had been passed by Senate, it returned to the Chamber
of Deputies which, no doubt, would have accepted the minor changes
proposed by the Senate. However, the military coup of 1930 suspended
the activities of Congress, and the law could not be passed until 1932.
The new Chamber of Deputies (elected in fraudulent elections and
without the Radical party) approved the law as it came from the Senate
Chamber. Conservatives in the Senate, notified of the new law in 1933,
did not receive the new legislation well. They tried to have it declared
unconstitutional but the law was already in place. Figure 1 shows the
spatial distribution of the Deputies’ and the Senators’ preferences con-
cerning the new law.
Spatial analysis of preferences was first introduced by Downs (1957)
and later adopted by political scientists 63. The horizontal line represents
the political issues, with both extremes representing opposing views on
a given topic. The vertical lines represent the preferred points for each
political actor, and the distance between the lines indicates how far apart
FIGURE 1
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 1929-32
Favorable
to Owners
Favorable
to Renters
Senate ‘32
S. Q.
Senate ‘29
Deputies ‘32
Deputies ‘29
E.P. (1929)
E.P. ‘32 Approved Law
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64 See Poole and Rosenthal, «Patterns»; Rosenthal, «Unidimensional Congress», and Ale-
sina and Rosenthal, «Partisan Politics».
65 See Seltzer, «Political Economy».
their points of view are. The Status Quo (S.Q.) represents the current
legislation, and the further a given actor, or political group, is from the
Status Quo, the stronger its preference for changing the legislation.
Spatial analysis is widely used in analyzing the ordering of preferences
of political bodies like Congress or during elections 64. It has also been
used in economic history analysis 65. In Figure 1, the Status Quo (S.Q.)
represents Law 11,170 of 1921. Moving along the line to the right, con-
tract regulations favor renters. Movements to the left indicate regula-
tions favorable to owners. The Chamber of Deputies and the Executive
Power (E.P.) held the strongest preferences for the new bill, conse-
quently their preferred points are found to the right of the horizontal
line. In 1928, the position of the Radical party strengthened in the
Senate. Furthermore, the UCR Antipersonalistas, even though allied with
the Conservatives, supported renters’ legislation. Hence, we can see the
Senate’s preferred point was closer to the Deputies and the Executive
than it had been in 1921. As a result, the bill extended renters’ rights,
removing the limits to the size of land plots and including the whole
country, not just the Pampean region. After the military coup, the new
Senate in 1932 moved closer to the Status Quo, which explains the
attempt to nullify the law. Besides, the Chamber of Deputies and the
Executive Power also moved toward the Status Quo, although still pre-
ferring to pass the renters’ law. It is worth mentioning that President
Justo, elected in 1932, came from the Radical Antipersonalistas and in
the Chamber of Deputies Antipersonalistas, Socialists and Democratas
Progresistas were able to defeat Conservatives, even though during the
rest of the 1930s the Antipersonalistas formed a coalition with the
Conservatives and Socialistas Independientes.
6. THE LEGACY OF THE RADICAL GOVERNMENTS
The Radical governments from 1916 to 1930 tried to introduce
tenancy reform; their success was modest and even disappointing becau-
se of their own political disputes, but more importantly because of the
role Conservatives played in Congress. Furthermore, as the previous
analysis shows, the division between parties made the issue even more
complex because of different policy preferences between the Pampean
provinces and the provinces of the Interior. Nonetheless, tenancy legis-
lation was passed when the Radicals controlled the Chamber of Deputies
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and under Yrigoyen’s presidencies (Figure 2). Even though the Radical
leadership was rooted in the same economic and social class as the
Conservatives, the Radicals, by allowing democracy and political insti-
tutions to work, became more aware of their electorate’s demands. This
explains why Radical Deputies supported rural rent legislation.
Furthermore, the democratic process allowed an evolution of legislation
as errors in the early law were adjusted and amended by succeeding
waves of reform.
Conservatives did not have popular support but they used their veto
power in the Senate to block legislation contrary to landowners’ inte-
rests. By 1930 Conservative influence in the Senate was declining and
complete control of Congress by the Radicals would have opened the
gates for further reform. However, the military coup of 1930 and the res-
toration of Conservatives to power eliminated the influence renters and
farmers had enjoyed in Congress and delayed legislation, even delaying
improved enforcement of existing laws.
Finally, enforcement of the new legislation was a more difficult issue
for two main reasons. First, after Yrigoyen, the new Radical government
had closer ties with the Conservatives even though they differed in many
issues. Second, as studied by Palacio (2001), at the micro level, contracts
were enforced by local judges who sympathized with landowners.
FIGURE 2
RADICAL PARTY STRENGTH IN DEPUTIES CHAMBER
AND NUMBER OF BILLS INTRODUCED
Source: Molinelli et al, 1999 and Cámara de Diputados several issues.
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66 See Halperin Donghi, «Republica».
67 See Schillizzi Moreno, «Argentina».
68 See Aguinaga and Azaretto, «Decada».
69 See Alston and Gallo, «Erosion of Rule of Law», and Halperin Donghi, «Republic».
70 President Ortiz was convinced that the system should return to normality. He nulli-
fied the elections for Deputies and Governors in the province of Buenos Aires in 1940 because
of the fraud, and called new elections. As a result, the Radical party easily won the election.
See Halperin Donghi, «Republica».
71 See Halperin Donghi, «Republica».
72 See Canton, «Elecciones y Partidos Politicos».
7. CONGRESS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE 1930S
On September 6th 1930 a military coup overthrew Yrigoyen and
established a military government 66. Eighteen months later the mili-
tary government called new elections banning the participation of offi-
cials from the Radical government 67. During the 1930s and early
1940s, the country was controlled by a coalition of parties which resor-
ted to fraud to hold office. This Conservative coalition, called
Concordancia, was formed by the UCR Antipersonalistas, the Partido
Demócrata Nacional and the Socialistas Independientes 68. Fraud was
perpetrated mainly to the detriment of the Radical party which had
popular support 69.
In the Chamber of Deputies the Concordancia kept enough seats to
retain its majority (Table 7). Because of prohibitions and persecutions,
the Radical party decided not to take part in elections from 1932 to 1934.
However, from 1936 on, the Radicals returned and gained some seats
despite the growing fraud. Finally, in the 1940 election, the government
decided to adopt a more transparent system, as evidenced by the incre-
ase in seats for the Radical Party (Table 7) 70.
During the 1930s, most of the members of the Agriculture Committee
came from the Pampean region but the Conservatives held the majority
of the seats. As the Radicals returned to engage in elections and the poli-
tical system opened up again in 1940, most of the members of the
Committee were from the Radical party 71. In the Senate, the
Conservatives had control during the 1930s but they lost some seats to
the Radicals at the end of the 1930s and beginning of the 1940s
(Table 7) 72.
As a consequence, the Democrata Nacional party controlled the
Senate during the first years, but needed their allies, Antipersonalistas
and Socialistas Independientes, to maintain the majority afterwards. The
Concordancia held a majority throughout the period, but reached its
lowest level in the last two years when the Radicals passed the law on
rural rents.
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8. REFORMS UNDER CONSERVATIVE RULE (1932-1943)
During the Conservative restoration of the 1930s, the government had
to face two crises in international markets which affected the rural sec-
tor and the economy as a whole 73. First, during the Great Depression,
TABLE 7
CONGRESS COMPOSITION 1932-42
(Percentage of total seats)
Note: Concordancia is the sum of Demócrata Nacional, Socialista Independiente and UCR
Antipersonalista.
Source: Molinelli, 1999.
Chamber of Deputies
1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942
UCR..................................................... — 1.3 25.6 40.8 48.1 40.6
Socialista ............................................ 27.4 27.7 16.0 3.2 3.2 11.0
Demócrata Progresista ...................... 8.9 7.7 3.8 — — —
UCR Antipersonalista ........................ 10.8 10.3 7.1 3.2 4.4 12.3
UCR Unificada ................................... 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.2 3.2 1.3
Socialista Independiente ................... 7.0 3.9 1.3 — — —
Demócrata Nacional .......................... 35.7 38.7 35.3 37.6 31.0 31.0
Liberal................................................. 3.2 2.6 1.3 0.6 — —
Other ................................................... 4.5 5.2 7.1 11.5 10.1 3.9
Total .................................................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Concordancia ..................................... 53.5 52.9 43.6 40.8 35.4 43.2
Senate
1932-34 1935-37 1938-40 1941-43
Demócrata Nacional.......................... 50.0 43.3 40.7 34.6
Socialista ............................................ 6.7 6.7 7.4 7.7
UCR Antipersonalista ........................ 23.3 30.0 22.2 23.1
UCR Bloquista ................................... 3.3 3.3 3.7 —
Defensa Provincial............................. 3.3 3.3 — —
Popular ............................................... 6.7 6.7 3.7 —
Democrata Progresista ...................... 6.7 3.3 3.7 7.7
Socialista Independiente................... — 3.3 — —
UCR .................................................... — — 18.5 23.1
Total.................................................... 100.0 100.0 100.0 96.2
Concordancia..................................... 73.3 76.7 63.0 57.7
73 See Diaz Alejandro, «Essays»; Alhadeff, «Economic Formulae», and della Paolera and
Taylor, «Straining the Anchor».
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74 See Díaz Alejandro, «Essays»; Balsa, «Crisis de 1930», and Botana et al., «Crisis de
1930».
75 See Díaz Alejandro, «Essays», and Pereyra, «Tiempos de la republica agropecuaria».
76 HCD, May 31st, 1933, Reunión 9, p. 322.
77 Id.
the government of General Agustin Pedro Justo sought to regulate rent
prices to help farmers survive the crisis. The second reform came during
the Second World War when, in response to the sudden closure of most
export markets in Europe to Argentine farmers, emergency measures for
tenants were provided by the Executive Power through Decrees.
Nonetheless, the Radicals, with a majority in the Chamber of Deputies,
sought to introduce new and long-lasting reforms to tenancy legislation.
Thus it may be seen that the main proposals for tenancy regulation had
their roots in severe economic crises.
During the first years of the government of President Justo, legisla-
tion presented in Congress had two main objectives. The first was to help
the country, especially the battered rural sector, overcome the crisis in
international markets 74. Among other measures, the government resor-
ted to bilateral negotiations with Great Britain to sustain rural exports,
created a Regulatory Board to maintain reasonable crop prices and
engaged in import substitution in order to help the economy recover 75.
Second, the government, especially those politicians related to the
Radicals Antipersonalistas, tried to win over the traditional electorate of
the Radicals. As a result, there was a high level of activity in Congress
during the first two years of the new government but results were insig-
nificant, and tenancy legislation had to wait until the Radicals regained
a majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
8.1. Legislation in the early Conservative government
The most important piece of legislation introduced in the early 1930s
was a bill to renegotiate rent prices. On April 5th 1932 the Executive
Power formed a Committee representing different rural institutions to
propose a series of bills to support and improve the rural sector 76. The
Committee consisted of several institutions which represented diverse
interests in the rural sector, the banking sector, and representatives of
the Ministry of Agriculture (HCD, 1932). Following the Committee’s
advice, the Executive Power sent a bill to Congress. The government
took into consideration the fact that rural rents had been adjusted pri-
vately, but the decline in international prices for rural products was big-
ger than the actual rent reduction 77. The bill provided for the creation of
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78 Id.
79 See Ciria, «Partidos y Poder».
mixed commissions for price settlement according to rural products’
market prices, land yield and production cost in each region 78.
In Congress, the most important political allies of the President were
the Antipersonalistas, who had presented a similar bill a few months ear-
lier. In September 1933, the Chamber passed the bill with important dif-
ferences to the proposal of the Executive Power. These changes were a
reflection of the influence of the Conservatives on the Chamber, who
refused to accept an extreme bill favoring the rural renters since the coa-
lition between Conservatives and big owners continued as strong as
ever 79. However, even with the changes introduced by Deputies, the
Senate never debated this bill and so it died in Congress. The spatial
analysis of preferences of each actor can be seen in Figure 3.
In this case, there is a new dimension in the policy spectrum of rural
rents; that of price control. The horizontal axis represents the regulation
dimension for contract clauses as explained before. The vertical axis
represents preferences on price regulation. Therefore, as we move north
in the graph, higher price control is desired. The dark points represent
the preferred combination of price control and contract regulations for
each actor, while the distance from the Status Quo shows level of disa-
greement with the current legislation. The circles centered on the prefe-
rred point for each actor and crossing the Status Quo are the indifferen-
ce curves for each actor. Each political group will prefer any point insi-
FIGURE 3
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 1933
Price control
Contract regulations
Executive Power
Deputies
Senate
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80 See Díaz Alejandro, «Essays».
81 The same system of price controls during the wars was applied in England (Offer,
1991).
de this circle to the Status Quo, since the distance from any point inside
the circle to the preferred point is shorter than the distance from the
Status Quo to the preferred point. The law discussed in 1929-1930,
which regulated some aspects of the contracts but said nothing about
prices, represents the Status Quo. The Executive Power wanted the price
controls as an emergency measure because of the Great Depression and
felt that price controls would be in line with similar regulations in other
areas of the economy. Accordingly, its preferred point is above the Status
Quo, given that the new bill did not propose changes to contract regula-
tions. It is interesting to notice that in this proposal the emphasis of the
reform shifted from contract regulations to price control, constituting
the first serious attempt to introduce rent price controls. Nonetheless,
the Chamber of Deputies did not agree on most of the reforms proposed
by the Executive and reduced the number of changes. Therefore, the pre-
ferred point for the Chamber of Deputies was above the Status Quo but
below the preferred point for the Executive. As a result, the bill passed
the Chamber of Deputies with many reforms. However, the Senate’s pre-
ferred point, because of the Conservative majority, was the Status Quo;
that is, they did not want t regulate prices. This explains why the Senate
never debated this bill.
8.2. The reform of 1940-1942
The tenancy reform of 1941-1942 was significantly different from
the previous two laws. First, the crisis in the international cereal mar-
kets created by the World War was even more serious than the Great
Depression 80. Most of the European markets for Argentine products
were closed and prices dropped sharply. In response, the Executive
Power dictated an emergency decree establishing a mechanism to tie
rural rent prices to the decline of international prices. Second, legis-
lators were pushing for broader reforms of rent prices and contract
extensions. Third, the Conservatives, especially the Executive Power,
were forced by the crisis to offer a real solution to the rural problem 81.
Fourth, the Radicals, both the UCR and the UCR Antipersonalista,
because of their majority in the Chamber of Deputies coupled with the
situation caused by the deep economic crisis, could now get what they
had only been able to propose before —improved conditions for ren-
ters.
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82 See Seltzer, «Political Economy».
The roll call in Congress illustrates Deputies’ preferences 82. On
September 9th 1941, the Conservatives tried to stop or delay this bill.
Deputies from the Conservative coalition voted against considering the
law. Meanwhile, Radicals, Socialistas and some of the Radicals’
Antipersonalistas voted to debate the bill immediately. It is worth noting
that some Radicals switched and voted with the Conservatives. It is also
interesting that most of the Deputies who voted for an immediate deba-
te came from the Pampean region. Therefore, as in previous cases,
Congress was divided along party lines (Conservatives and their allies
versus Radicals and their allies) and along regional lines (Pampean
region versus the rest of the country). Econometric analysis of the roll-
call vote shows this division between party and regional lines (Table 8).
TABLE 8
LOGISTIC REGRESSION DEPUTIES’ CHAMBER POSTPONES
RURAL RENTERS’ BILL
(Dependent variable: Postpone: 1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Radical...................................... –5.393 1.3618(***) — —
Socialista Antipersonalistas ..... –3.588 1.4443(**) — —
Pampean ................................... — 1.2216 –1.180 —
Región....................................... 1.102 — — 0.5205(**)
Seniority ................................... –0.006 0.1272 — —
Constat...................................... 2.962 1.2178(**) 0.762 0.4577(*)
Pseudo R2: 0.4599 Pseudo R2: 0.041
Predictability: 86.21% Predictability: 62.22%
Log Likelihood: –32.545 Log Likelihood: –59.443
Observations: 90 Observations: 90
(***) Significative 1%, (**) Significative 5%, (*) Significative 10%.
Logistic Model for Vote (Model 2)
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83 The Pampean region included the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, Cor-
doba, and Capital Federal.
84 See Blasco, «Arrendamientos y Aparcerias Rurales».
85 See Blasco, «Arrendamientos y Aparcerias Rurales».
The dependent variable is the vote on delaying the debate of the bill. The
independent variables are the Radical Party (Radical), Socialistas
(Socialist), UCR Antipersonalista (Antipersonalistas), Deputies from the
Pampean Region (Pampean Region) and Deputies’ seniority
(Seniority) 83. In the first model we included all the variables, showing
that the coalition of Radicals, Socialistas and Antipersonalistas rejected
the proposal of delay. Seniority and regional differences were not signi-
ficant. If we only consider regional differences (Model 2), we can see that
Deputies from the Pampean region were against postponing debate on
the bill.
Model 1 has a high level of predictability, 86.2 per cent. As a result,
Radicals, Socialistas and, to some extent, Antipersonalistas, favored
tenant farmers, while Democratas Nacionales and other smaller
Conservative parties aligned with owners. Furthermore, we can see that
some regional differences existed, with those Deputies from the
Pampean region being more akin to renters’ preferences.
Given the urgency of the situation, the Executive Power issued two
Decrees establishing the institutions to renegotiate rent prices 84. The
decrees created a centralized Arbitrage Committee in charge of the
system. This Committee had to name local Committees which had the
authority to arbitrate between renters and owners. Price adjustment was
not compulsory and once agreed upon by all parties, the new price
would continue in force as long as the markets were in crisis 85. Radicals
presented several bills containing most of the clauses contained in the
Executive decrees (Table 9). However, they had to deal with the
Conservatives who still dominated the Senate. The Executive Power sent
a bill on which complemented the previously established decree
(Table 9). The Chamber of Deputies introduced important changes to the
bill, the most important being the limitation of the law to rural produc-
tion of cereals, i.e. to the Pampean region. This change was similar to the
one that allowed the approval of Law 11,170 in the Senate in 1921.
Besides, the bill excluded those contracts on mixed crop production, cat-
tle raising and breeding, making the bill more acceptable to Conservative
groups from the Pampas. On the other hand, it gave more rights to the
renter than the original bill from the Executive Power, such as penalties
and automatic adjustment of rent prices. The Radicals brought the pro-
posal to create Arbitrage Boards back to the table. This proposal was
supported by the Committee created by the Executive Power in 1933 and
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86 Deputy Mario Guido, (UCR) from the Province of Buenos Aires, when he presented
the bill in the Chamber. HCD, September 2nd, 1941, p. 744.
was included in the bill the Executive Power sent to the Congress.
Despite the important changes proposed in the bill, the idea behind it
was that fixing prices would be a transitory requirement to overcome the
market crisis:
«All the solutions proposed —inside and outside of Congress— are
in agreement that the rural renter’s pricing problem is transitory
and is caused by the difference between domestic and export pro-
duct prices that has resulted from the war-time closing of foreign
markets to such products. Then, given that the problem is transi-
tory, the remedy is an emergency one and carries with it the con-
viction that once the grave situation has passed, the remedy will
be no longer needed» 86.
The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill which went to the Senate
and was passed with certain reforms (Table 9). Finally, the law was
approved on September 23rd 1942.
The preferences of the different actors played a key role in deciding
the final characteristics of the law (Figure 4).
The Executive Power and Chamber of Deputies also preferred an
increase in the number of controls in rural rent contracts, such as the
FIGURE 4
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM 1942
Price control
Contract regulations
Executive
PowerDeputies
Senate
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87 See Seltzer, «Political Economy».
88 See Palacio, «La estancia Mixta», and Palacio, «La paz del trigo».
extension of contract terms. Nonetheless, the Chamber of Deputies wan-
ted fewer controls because of the need to pass the law and convince the
Conservatives in the Senate, especially those from small provinces, who
preferred the Status Quo. Radicals and other Senators from the
Pampean region preferred a solution similar to the one offered by the
Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, as in the 1920-1921 reform, the
Chamber of Deputies created the right incentives for Conservatives to
pass the law. They limited the law to cereal production, leaving provin-
ces outside the Pampean region unaffected. In the Senate, Radicals allo-
wed contract flexibility for cattle raisers in the Pampas who were con-
nected to Conservatives. In this reform process we can see again the ten-
sion which cut across parties, that is, Radicals and Conservatives, and
across regions, that is, the Pampas and the interior of the country. It is
interesting to notice that this pattern existed under democracy and
under fraud, and defined Argentine politics for more than thirty years.
Furthermore, during this period, Congress institutions provided the
environment to foster compromises in legislation. The shadowed area
formed by the combination of preferences of the Senate, the Executive
Power and the Chamber of Deputies is the Pareto Optimal set for policy
reform 87. This area represents all the points in which the Chamber of
Deputies, most of the Senate and the Executive Power could reach an
agreement which increased everybody’s welfare. It is interesting to noti-
ce how preferences changed from the reform in 1933. In this case, there
is an increasing shift in the preferences of the Executive and the
Chamber of Deputies to control rents and to introduce further regula-
tions on rent contracts. In contrast to the 1933 bill, this piece of legisla-
tion was passed, but in the end it was not applied s the military Coup of
1943 nullified it by a decree, starting a series of dramatic changes for
rural rents in Argentina. Nonetheless, this analysis shows how, from
1920 to 1942, preferences in Congress moved towards increasing the
level of rent control and contract regulations.
9. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TENANCY REFORM
During this period, tenancy reform was not as effective in promoting
sweeping changes in the performance of the agriculture sector and
tenancy contracts. The first reason was that reforms were not as drama-
tic as the debate in Congress appeared to suggest 88. Second, even though
some of these reforms were important, the enforcement of the law was
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89 See Palacio, «La paz del trigo».
90 Availability of land prices for the period of study corresponds to the province of Buenos
Aires.
91 See, Díaz Alejandro, «Essays»; Di Tella and Zimelman, «Ciclos economicos»; Della Pao-
lera and Taylor, «Straining», and Della Paolera and Taylor, «Economic Recovery».
weak. This allowed many owners to avoid the regulations of the law 89.
Nonetheless, we can detect some changes in land prices and rents after
the introduction of these laws, especially after the 1932 legislation 90. In
the province of Buenos Aires, land prices increased as a consequence of
the booming exporting sector, although the First World War and the
Great Depression had a negative impact on real land values (Figure 5).
In the First World War and its subsequent recession, land prices fell by
45 per cent from 1912 to 1920, while from 1931 to 1934 land prices fell
by 37 per cent.
The evolution of land prices closely followed that of the Rural Sector
GDP (Figure 6). Nonetheless, we can observe a disconnection between
the GDP of the rural sector and land prices after the Great Depression
(Figure 6). This cannot be attributed to the passing of the second
tenancy law since there were other measures implemented by the
government during this period 91.
FIGURE 5
LAND PRICES PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina and Boletin
Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
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92 The actual correlation after 1930 is negative. The same dissociation between prices
is observed for the case of wheat, maize and flaxseed.
Nonetheless, the evolution of land prices with respect to those of beef
and main crops followed a similar pattern (Figure 7). The ratio of land
prices with respect to beef, maize and wheat suffered a major setback
during the First World War and the Great Depression, recovering vigo-
rously in the 1920s. In the 1930s, the sharp decrease in land prices with
respect to rural prices was maintained with low levels throughout the
decade (Figure 7).
The decline in land prices with respect to rural products in the 1930s
was not simply an indication of the international economic conditions
but also reflected changes in the domestic functioning of markets. As
Figure 7 shows, there was a high correlation between land prices and
beef prices before the 1930s, but subsequently this correlation is much
weaker 92.
With respect to the relationship between rent prices and land prices
there are three main results. First, land prices fared better than rent pri-
ces during the Great Depression (Figure 9). From 1929 to 1933 rent pri-
ces declined by 40 per cent, while the decline in land prices was 14 per
cent. Since land continued to decline, rent prices should also have decli-
FIGURE 6
LAND PRICES AND RURAL SECTOR GDP
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina, Boletin
Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and CEPAL, 1958.
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93 Data for the years 1934-38 were not found.
ned after 1933 93. From 1929 to 1941, the total decline in land prices was
19 per cent while that of rent prices amounted to 27 per cent. The strong
decline in rent prices could have been an effect of the legislation on rents
which, by forcing contracts to be at least five years in duration, did not
allow for adjustment in rent prices. On the other hand, the international
recession and lower exports could also have had an impact on rent pri-
ces.
Second, after 1929 there is a tendency for owners in the Pampean
region to shift toward rent contracts paid as a percentage of the crop ins-
tead of cash contracts. In the rest of the provinces the tendency is to shift
toward cash contracts instead (Table 10). This change in the structure of
contracts could have resulted from two factors. On one hand, the more
volatile international conditions could have increased the benefits of
having a contract priced as a percentage of a crop since it would have
minimized the effects of crop’s price volatility on rent payments. On the
other hand, contracts by percentage allowed owners to deal with infla-
tion more effectively, given that the law established that contracts should
be signed for at least five years.
FIGURE 7
RATIO OF LAND PRICES AND RURAL SECTOR PRICES
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina and Boletin
Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
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Finally, a higher percentage of renters with legal contracts is correla-
ted with a lower rent price per hectare (Figure 10). This could be an indi-
cation that the regulation of the law provided lower prices for renters as
the law required a minimum contract term of five years. This evidence
is also correlated with the previous evidence of the switch toward con-
tracts with share rents. Furthermore, the data show that a higher per-
centage of renters with a legal contract was not strongly correlated with
the price share on the contract (Figure 11). As a result, there is some evi-
dence supporting the claim that the law increased the advantage of using
share contracts and depressed cash rent prices. These data suggest that
legislation could have had an impact on contractual decisions even
though the general market forces continued to rule contracts.
FIGURE 8
LAND PRICES AND BEEF PRICES
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina and Boletin
Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
(1931-1942)
0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00
Real Land Price (1960 prices)
Re
al
Be
ef
Pr
ice
(19
60
pr
ice
s)
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0.00
(1913-1930)
Re
al
Be
ef
Pr
ice
(19
60
pr
ice
s)
50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00 300.00 350.00
Real Land Price (1960 prices)
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: RURAL RENTER LEGISLATION...
289
FIGURE 9
LAND AND RENT PRICES 
(Real Values 1960)
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina and Boletin
Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
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FIGURE 10
CONTRACTS AND PRICE OF RENT
Source: Own elaboration based Boletin Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
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TABLE 10
NUMBER OF FARMS AND TENANCY
Cereals and Flaxseed (except Maize)
Source: Own elaboration based on Anuario Agropecuario de la Nación Argentina and Boletín
Estadístico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
Share- Percentage of
Country Total Owners
Renters
croppers Contracts as %
Cash Share
Totals
1929..................... 152,281 58,852 38,178 50,179 5,072 —
1932..................... 133,447 48,790 30,474 49,487 4,696 —
1933..................... 135,800 49,185 27,808 54,391 4,416 —
Buenos Aires
1929..................... 49,023 18,676 19,771 9,607 969 19.6
1932..................... 52,346 18,672 18,393 13,931 1,350 26.6
1933..................... 55,120 18,035 17,642 18,140 1,303 32.9
Santa Fe
1929..................... 43,650 16,203 8,994 16,791 1,662 38.5
1932..................... 34,530 11,486 5,681 15,879 1,484 46.0
1933..................... 34,670 13,155 5,308 14,986 1,221 43.2
Cordoba
1929..................... 27,287 10,370 2,875 13,027 1,015 47.7
1932..................... 21,155 7,717 1,691 11,075 672 52.4
1933..................... 22,850 7,963 1,469 12,721 697 55.7
Entre Rios
1929..................... 22,840 10,113 4,202 7,341 1,184 32.1
1932..................... 17,256 7,465 3,328 5,480 983 31.8
1933..................... 13,880 6,163 1,918 5,005 794 36.1
La Pampa
1929..................... 8,336 2,931 2,247 2,986 172 35.8
1932..................... 6,385 2,496 1,248 2,519 122 39.5
1933..................... 5,950 2,171 994 2,626 159 44.1
Rest of the Country
1929..................... 1,145 559 89 427 70 37.3
1932..................... 1,775 954 133 603 85 34.0
1933..................... 3,330 1,698 477 913 242 27.4
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10. CONCLUSIONS
From the late nineteenth century to 1943 we can distinguish three
main periods in Argentina’s political history. First, the Conservatives
held power until 1912 without much political opposition in Congress
because of the absence of clear and unbiased democratic rules. In this
period there were no bills concerning rural rents and free contracting
was the rule. Furthermore, legislative attempts to redistribute land were
too weak or inefficiently designed to produce meaningful results. In the
second period, from 1912 to 1930, democracy gave the middle class a
political voice. The influence of small landowners and tenants in
Congress increased. The Radical party and its allies in Congress were the
advocates for legislation concerning rents. The Radicals sought to
improve living and market conditions for renters without imposing
harsh regulation of the rental market. Even though the Radical govern-
ment held the same view of the economy as the Conservatives, they sup-
ported rent legislation because of their need to maintain support in their
constituencies. As in any democratic society, Congress became the place
to discuss and reach consensus on reforms and legislation. Within
Congress, Conservatives had veto power in the Senate and used it suc-
cessfully to reduce the scope of the reforms proposed by the Radicals.
The analysis presented in this paper counters the traditional notion that
the Radical party legislated in favor of Conservatives’ interests with a
FIGURE 11
CONTRACTS AND SHARE RENTS
Source: Own elaboration based Boletin Estadistico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.
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more nuanced view of the interplay between institutions and policy out-
comes. I use evidence from the legislative process over rental legislation
to show how the Conservatives turned reforms to their benefit. It is clear
from the analysis that Conservatives controlled politics in small provin-
ces but Radicals controlled the Pampean region. Accordingly, legislation
responded to the different economic interests of the two regions.
In the third period, beginning with a military coup in 1930, subse-
quent electoral fraud allowed the Conservatives to stay in power. Most
legislation, including tenancy reform, took the form of emergency legis-
lation, because of the Great Depression and the Second World War. In the
1930s, the Antipersonalistas had a dual role, backing the Conservatives in
government, but supporting some initiatives from the Radicals in
Congress. By the early 1940s, the Radicals controlled Congress again and
pushed for further tenancy reform. Once again, the cleavage between
Radicals and Conservatives and between the Pampas and the rest of the
country was decisive when it came to passing legislation. Finally, throug-
hout the period of analysis, rental legislation was sought as complemen-
tary to markets. Furthermore, during the early years of open democracy
there seemed to be a process of learning to compromise. Congress passed
legislation and then reviewed it over time learning from their mistakes.
The passage of the most important legislation during this period corres-
ponds to the years in which the Radical party achieved a majority of seats
in the Chamber of Deputies. Even though this legislation did not promo-
te a revolutionary change in tenancy policy, the empirical evidence shows
that it had some influence on contract decisions.
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